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established in breach of international obligations is still followed. Although the United
States during this period several times restated its traditional policy of recognizing de
facto governments and states which gave evidence of permanency, popular support,
and willingness to abide by international law, in practice it departed from this policy
on many occasions. These new policies have made necessary in the Digest considerable
sections on conditional recognition, acts falling short of recognition and effects of nonrecognition.
Among other sections of political as well as juristic interest are those concerning
arms embargoes and other sanctions, mandates, plebiscites and the doctrine of selfdetermination, opposition to conquest, title to arctic and antarctic regions, and efforts
to extend the marginal seas beyond the three-mile limit. Some of these topics, though
of great importance, are tucked away under other headings which figured in Moore's
Digest. The material would doubtless have suggested a more extensive revision of
Moore's classification though the convenience of preserving that classification, so far as
possible, undoubtedly justifies Hackworth's decision.
The present work is scholarly and convenient to use. The material is indispensable
to the international lawyer and to foreign office officials and will also be of value to
diplomatic historians. The editor, who is at present Legal Adviser of the Department
of State, is to be congratulated on carrying on the work in spare hours of a life well
occupied with contemporary problems. It is to be hoped that the increasing gravity of
the world crisis will not delay the production of the remaining volumes.
Quincy WRIGHTt

Handbook of the Law of Torts. By William L. Prosser.* St. Paul: West Publishing
Co., 1941. Pp. xiii, i3o9. $5.oo.
The task of reviewing a textbook on torts is not an easy one. Professor Prosser's
book is well over eleven hundred pages long; and this reviewer has deemed it impracticable, in view of other commitments on his time, to read the book from cover to
cover. Instead of doing this I have looked it through very carefully and have read the
parts dealing with subjects on which I have done a considerable amount of investigation and with respect to which I may be said to have more or less educated convictions.
As a result of this, I have come to the conclusion that the book is an excellent, concise
treatment of the subject of torts and I believe it to be the most useful and thorough
compendium and panoramic work of its kind between two covers. At the risk of being
thought to have made an invidious comparison, I cannot keep from openly judging it
by the high standard already set by Professor Harper, whose book I have used with
great appreciation as a necessary supplement to my casebook and classroom hours in
teaching torts. While not belittling Harperon Tortsin any way, I would like to suggest
that Professor Prosser's treatment of the subject is considerably more catholic than
Professor Harper's. The latter's established work, in my opinion, is inclined to be conventionalized and to reflect too obviously the Restatement of Torts as a standard and as
a point of departure. Nor do I wish to belittle, in turn, the Restatement, which is a
monumental tribute to the integrity and industry of its various reporters, chiefly Prot Professor of International Law, University of Chicago.
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fessor Bohlen. But in my opinion, it tends to create a somewhat misleading sense of
certainty about the law and ventures too seldom into either analysis or appreciation
of novel developments. Perhaps all I mean is that Professor Prosser seems to have
written about this ill-defined subject more as I tend to see it and think about it than
did Professor Harper and the learned restaters.
Professor Prosser is guilty of some of the sins of omission or, perhaps, elision, which
must inevitably occur in an undertaking of the kind he chose to embark upon. After
all, eleven hundred-odd pages is just not room enough to do real justice to the subject
of torts. Indeed, he very wisely says as much when he indicates that the most helpful
and penetrating analyses occur in texts on particular torts and in law review literature.'
With becoming humility, he purports to submit a concise general treatment of the subject with exhaustive references to the more detailed discussions available in such texts
and in law reviews. At the same time he undertakes to give at least thumb nail sketches
or indications of the salient features of most of these other writings and takes great
pains to suggest to his readers that much speculation is going on concerning the state of
the law dealing not only with particular phases of the subject of torts but also with the
adequacy of views asserted with respect to some of the most fundamental bases of tort
theory, liability, and policy. So the upshot is that a student who depends on Professor
Prosser's book for his knowledge of the law of torts has at best but an imperfect notion
of its multiple intricacies and facets; yet this same student with an adequate law library at his disposal has in the book under review a key to as near perfection of knowledge of this broad subject as he can hope to find. The contrast between this book, with
its wealth of citations to cases and secondary authorities, and the Restatement, with its
authoritarian and somewhat arbitrary approach, is startling. Sharing the belief that
there is no royal road to the understanding of tort law, I nevertheless believe Professor
Prosser's book to be the best available set of directions to the hard way which most of
us have to follow to achieve any sort of comprehensive insight into this particular
branch of knowledge.
To get down to particulars, I regret Professor Prosser's not having consolidated the
material dealing with trespass and case,2 some of that dealing with trespass to land,3
some of that dealing with unavoidable accident,4 some of that concerning res ipsa
loquitur,s and that dealing with dangerous things and activities and the theory of
absolute liability6 into a well-knit modernization and hornbook treatment of the notion
first appearing in Holmes's third lecture in his Common Law. Personally, I believe the
result of such a consolidation would be a new perspective on a good deal of our tort law
that otherwise seems disjointed and arbitrary. The desirability of such a treatment is,
I realize, a matter of personal opinion; but I think the burden is on those who have
time to write books to introduce some synthesis into a rather messy subject and to
explain, by making them part of a pattern, some of the curiosities of tort law such as
Hay v. The Cohoes Ce.7 and Green v. General Petroleum Corp.8 which, as isolated
phenomena, seem contrary to the rules and principles as we have inherited them from
our ancestors. Again, I become a little glum when I read the section on conversion.9
For years, I fear, it has been the fashion for professors of torts to assume that the
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troublesome issues arising in actions for conversion are adequately covered in courses
on property. But this is certainly an unwarrantid assumption; and it is a particularly
unsafe one for an author of a textbook on torts to share. In my opinion there is a good
deal left unsaid and even unsuggested in Professor Prosser's treatment which I should
suppose the user of a textbook might count on finding in it. As instances of what I
mean, I suggest the troublesome issues arising out of Candy v. Lindsay, ° Hollins v.
Fowler," and the Rymill cases,1 2 and those involved in Varney v. Curtis'sand Leuthold v.
Fairchild'4--allconsidered from the point of view, in turn, of certain mooted policies in
the law of sales. If the necessity for terseness and brevity in writing a textbook forced
Professor Prosser into the verbal reticence displayed in this section, then it is fortunate
indeed that most of our law schools have abandoned the textbook in favor of the casebook as a teaching vehicle.
But the repetition of instances wherein I believe the treatment of particular subject
matter to have been insufficiently detailed and analytical may seem to detract from the
very high opinion of the book I have already stated above. But, just because I feel
that I could hold forth at length on how Professor Prosser might better have handled
the material on so-called proximate cause in negligence actions does not necessarily
mean that what he chose to include is not an excellent short treatment of that baffling
subject. Nor would one expect in a work of this nature the sort of speculation on the
development of "enterprise liability" under the name of negligence and its associated
tags as appears in a recent note in the University of Chicago Law Review. s Rather, one
is pleased to observe the frequent instances of Professor Prosser's care and observation
in having brought to light and exposed questionable features in the law which need
some ridicule cast upon them, such as parts of imputed negligence and the doctrine of
"libel per quod," as well as his understanding treatment of such theoretically untenable
but nonetheless socially significant developments of "enterprise liability" as that of
manufacturers to consumers occurring under the label of warranty.
Pervading my reaction to Professor Prosser's book is the renewed feeling of dismay
at the terrific number of matters which are included under the title of Torts. It is perhaps small wonder that he did not completely satisfy me in the cursory treatment he
afforded some aspects of the subject on which I believe he should have enlarged. After
having given the entire book a more than casual inspection, I am willing to give Professor Prosser considerable applause for merely having undertaken the work. But his
having actually achieved such a fine job earns not only my unstinted admiration but
also first place along with Harper on Torts among the citations of outside authorities
for the students in my class on Torts.
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